

~~ATTACHMENT A~~~~12 Jan 66~~~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD~~~~SUBJECT: Press Attacks on Director Raborn~~

Listed below are newspaper and magazine articles which have ~~personally~~ been critical of Director Raborn personally or which have made allegations about discontent in the Agency since he became Director:

- A. Evans and Novak Column, 9 Jan 66 (N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE, WASHINGTON POST, etc.)
--on Ray Cline leaving and declining morale
- B. Marianne Means Column, 5 Jan 66 (N.Y. JOURNAL AMERICAN, BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN, etc.)--on what people are saying about the DCI's aptitude
- C. Ulf Nilson article, 28 Dec 65 (EXPRESSEN of Stockholm, Sweden)--on how LBJ finds the DCI boring and others find him ignorant
- D. NEWSWEEK article, 27 Dec 65--on the "leaky ship" at CIA
- E. NEWSWEEK "Periscope" article, 20 Dec 65--on DCI's concern over high-level leaks critical of his administration
- F. Carl Rowan Column, 19 Dec 65 (WASHINGTON STAR, etc.)--on reply to criticism of CIA
- G. Allen and Scott Column, 17 Dec 65 (LAS VEGAS SUN, etc.)--on administrationite sniping, some in the State Department, at the DCI
- H. Marianne Means Column, 3 Dec 65 (N.Y. JOURNAL AMERICAN)--on DCI being disappointingly ineffective as a Macy selection
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--on CIA crisis attributable to lack of confidence in the DCI
- J. Richard Dudman article, 28 Nov 65 (ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH)--on DCI appearance being inept before Senate committee hearings on Dominican Republic
- K. Joseph Kraft Column, 1 Nov 65 (WASHINGTON POST, CHICAGO NEWS, etc.)--on jibes about the DCI's ability to run CIA
- L. NEWSWEEK "Periscope" article, 13 Sept 65--on DCI shuttering the CIA "public affairs" office (with subsequent N.Y. TIMES explanation)
- M. Ted Lewis article, 22 May 65 (N.Y. DAILY NEWS, BUFFALO, NY., NEWS)--on LBJ making list of likely scapegoats in Dominican impasse
- N. Marquis Childs Column, 21 May 1965 (ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, WASHINGTON POST)
--on CIA password now being "gung ho" flowing DCI's part in Dominican crisis
- O. Ted Lewis article, 14 Apr 65 (N.Y. DAILY NEWS)--on prospects of the new DCI being able to improve CIA

The submission of the names of communists in the Dominican Republic, with several mistakes, embarrassed the Administration. (B, J, N)

It is possible that the feeling against Raborn from within CIA stems from a clash of personalities. (B

There are stories of urgent conferences at CIA suddenly untracked as Raborn dilated at length on how he took over the Polaris project in 1955. (D

Other CIA staffers are irked by the way Raborn handles CIA analyses and mangles their semantics when he reports to the NSC. (D, K)

When Joseph Kraft broke the story of CIA morale problems the security boys were running up and down the hall trying to find out who knew this columnist. (D

Because secrecy is his business Raborn ~~cannot~~ is handicapped in counterposing a record of public achievement; the job of assistant to the director for public affairs was abolished in September because "we have no public affairs." (D)

Plus factors for Raborn: LBJ had decided on Dominican intervention before Raborn took over; a jovial manner that pleases important foreign guests at golf matches (he plays a generally bad game); he has guts to ask the Budget Bureau for more money; although he may not speak the Queen's English once he is given an explanation about an operation he has a lot of common sense about it. (D)

Under Raborn, some contemplate a day when DIA will effectively monopolize the undercover spy business while CIA supervises only overt intelligence, argot for material that appears in public print. (D)

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aborn is fighting ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ what he considers a campaign by his own staff~~xxx~~ to discredit him; he has already exiled one top aide to the field and others may follow. (E

Foreigners who criticize CIA most (USSR, Ghana, etc.) know that CIA is a good intelligence organization, one whose ratio of incompetents is no higher than that of the U.S. Senate. (F

he standard device for scorning CIA around the world is to discredit the Peace Corps, USIA, and other American agencies by linking them to CIA. (F

uspicion and fear of CIA abroad has become an Achilles heel of U.S. foreign policy, which may seem to justify attacks on CIA in Congress and elsewhere. (F

people in Zambia (probably based on their reading of "The Invisible Government") believe fervently that CIA is in the business of overthrowing and installing governments all over the world--without the approval and knowledge of the Secretary of State and the President. (F

Secretary of State Rusk's commendation of CIA, at a White House conference on international cooperation, is significant because of sniping by certain administrationites at Raborn; these sources, some in the State Department, have been planting critical stories with newsmen, and Rusk was asked at the conference: "What can be done when the CIA seems to be making policy, completely removed from the public and even from government control?" (G

is no secret that White House personnel adviser John Macy has made suggestions which have not met with the President's high standards: he pushed strongly for the appointment of Raborn, who has been disappointingly ineffective. (H

e Raborn crisis, one of confidence in him, has become a top concern among Johnson Administration officials who deal with the problem.

MAY 9 1965

CPYRGHT

Letter Asking U.S. Troop Aid Is Made Public

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Organization of American States made public yesterday a letter from a Dominican Republic official requesting American military intervention to protect lives.

Contents of the document, which President Johnson referred to in his original announcement of April 28 that American forces were landing on Dominican soil, had not previously been disclosed.

It is the first evidence to support the United States assertion that it was intervening at the request of Dominican authorities to protect lives and property.

Dated April 28, the letter was written by former junta President Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit to U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett Jr.

Heads 2d Regime

Benoit was installed as leader of what has been called the second provisional government early on the same day that he wrote to the American Ambassador.

The first provisional government was that of Rafael Molina Urena, installed by the rebels when they expected the imminent return of former President Juan Bosch. But Molina sought refuge in the Colombian embassy when anti-rebel troops made incursions into the center of Santo Domingo.

The five-man Special OAS Committee printed the letter in its report to the OAS Council yesterday, after its return from Santo Domingo.

United States officials said they had not previously published the letter, even though it supports the President's action, because it was submitted in evidence to the OAS.

Lives in Danger

The Benoit letter to Bennett contains the seal of the Dominican Republic and is on stationery of the Office of the Air Force Chief of Staff. It was sent to Bennett after an oral request Benoit had made to him. The letter follows:

"Regarding my earlier request I wish to add that American lives are in danger and conditions of public disorder make it impossible to provide adequate protection. I therefore ask you for temporary intervention and assistance in restoring order in this country."

The OAS Special Committee said that when it arrived in Santo Domingo last week it immediately sought to ascertain "whether it was true that the action of United States military forces in the Dominican Republic had been requested." The report added:

"Col. Benoit explained that the deterioration of public order in the city of Santo Domingo, which started on the day that the movement against Mr. Reid Cabral began, and the conditions of anarchy and complete disorder that prevailed in the capital of the

country had led him to request the aid of United States armed forces in order to give protection to the diplomatic missions and foreign persons and entities in general.

"Col. Benoit added that he had received an urgent request from the diplomatic missions for protection that he was not able to provide. Col. Benoit also stated that the request had been made to the United States in a note, a copy of which was transmitted later to the Special Committee."

After President Johnson's dramatic intervention announcement on the evening of April 28, U.S. officials reported that the President acted after representatives of the second provisional government and the Santo Domingo police chief had informed Benoit that safety of Americans could no longer be guaranteed. But no documentation was provided at the time.

2
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Raborn oversimplified the explanation of the Dominican crisis. (B, I, J)

The submission of the names of communists in the Dominican Republic, with several mistakes, embarrassed the Administration. (B, J, N)

It is possible that the feeling against Raborn from within CIA stems from a clash of personalities. (B)

There are stories of urgent conferences at CIA suddenly untracked as Raborn dilated at length on how he took over the Polaris project in 1955. (D)

Other CIA staffers are irked by the way Raborn handles CIA analyses and mangles their semantics when he reports to the NSC. (D, K)

When Joseph Kraft broke the story of CIA morale problems the security boys were running up and down the hall trying to find out who knew this columnist. (D)

Because secrecy is his business Raborn ~~cannot~~ is handicapped in counterposing a record of public achievement; the job of assistant to the director for public affairs was abolished in September because "we have no public affairs." (D)

Plus factors for Raborn: LBJ had decided on Dominican intervention before Raborn took over; a jovial manner that pleases important foreign guests at golf matches (he plays a generally bad game); he has guts to ask the Budget Bureau for more money; although he may not speak the Queen's English once he is given an explanation about an operation he has a lot of horse sense about it. (D)

Under Raborn, some contemplate a day when DIA will effectively monopolize the undercover spy business while CIA supervises only overt intelligence, argot for material that appears in public print. (D)

Dulles ran a happy ship, McCone a taut ship, and Raborn a sinking ship. (D)
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Raborn is fighting ~~xxxxxxx~~ what he considers a campaign by his own staff ~~xxx~~ to discredit him; he has already exiled one top aide to the field and others may follow. (E)

Foreigners who criticize CIA most (USSR, Ghana, etc.) know that CIA is a good intelligence organization, one whose ratio of incompetents is no higher than that of the U.S. Senate. (F)

The standard device for scorning CIA around the world is to discredit the Peace Corps, USIA, and other American agencies by linking them to CIA. (F)

Suspicion and fear of CIA abroad has become an Achilles heel of U.S. foreign policy, which may seem to justify attacks on CIA in Congress and elsewhere. (F)

People in Zambia (probably based on their reading of "The Invisible Government") believe fervently that CIA is in the business of overthrowing and installing governments all over the world--without the approval and knowledge of the Secretary of State and the President. (F)

Secretary of State Rusk's commendation of CIA, at a White House conference on international cooperation, is significant because of sniping by certain administrationites at Raborn; these sources, some in the State Department, have been planting critical stories with newsmen, and Rusk was asked at the conference: "What can be done when the CIA seems to be making policy, completely removed from the public and even from government control?" (G)

It is no ^{some} secret that White House personnel adviser John Macy has made suggestions which have not met with the President's high standards: he pushed strongly for the appointment of Raborn who has been disappointingly ineffective. (H)

The Raborn crisis, one of confidence in him, has become a top concern among Johnson Administration officials who deal with national security. (I)
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CPYRGHT

U.S. Aides to Debate With President's Critics

Presidential assistant McGeorge Bundy and other Government officials will square off with academic critics of President Johnson's policy in Viet-Nam in a "teach-in" to be held in Washington on May 15.

Bundy's office confirmed yesterday that Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has accepted the invitation — or challenge — of the Inter-University Committee for a Public Hearing on Viet-Nam.

The committee, based at the University of Michigan, is staging the all-day session in the ballroom of the Sheraton-Park Hotel. Attendance is by invitation only, but the committee expects 3000 people.

"We're hoping to stimulate a well-reasoned dialogue,"

Michigan's Prof. Marshall Sahlins said. "We're not trying to score debating points."

The morning will feature speeches by former White House aide Arthur M. Schlesinger in support of the Administration and by Hans J. Morvanthau of the University of Chicago and George M. Kahin of Cornell University in opposition.

Bundy will speak in the afternoon, then join a panel of professors favorable to the Administration in a debate with a panel in opposition.

A special telephone hookup will carry the afternoon session to at least 60 campuses and radio stations across the country, Sahlins said.

Evening seminars on various aspects of the problem also will be held.

(ATTACHMENT B)

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The major charges ~~which~~ made in these articles are summarized below, with the source identified (by corresponding letter in parentheses) to the listing in ~~the~~ attachment A:

Declining morale at CIA will be accelerated by decision of top-flight professional to resign DD/I for lesser job. This will leave gaping ~~in~~ CIA at time when internal dissatisfaction with Raborn is highest. (A) *also in*

~~Raborn's lack of sophistication~~

Several prominent and responsible government officials outside CIA and some pros inside have such serious doubts about Raborn's aptitude for the job of DCI that they are openly voicing their concern. (B, K)

Raborn cannot grasp the nuances of complicated international politics. (B, D, I, J, K)

Away from the military system to which he is accustomed Raborn is a sloppy administrator. (B)

As a result of Raborn's lack of sophistication CIA is rapidly losing influence on U.S. policy to the FBI and military intelligence. (B)

Raborn is no happier with CIA than his critics with him; his wife told friends that "Red wants out." (B)

The fact that the attacks sound so authoritative and are so widespread weakens effectiveness of Raborn and CIA; public suspicion and lack of confidence in CIA projects might cause congressional demands for budget figures to be made public. (B)

Raborn bawls out extremely well-qualified workers as if they were common seamen. (C, D)

Raborn is ~~inexperienced~~ *inexperienced in intelligence and* espionage work. (C, D, I, K, N)

Recommendations by CIA professionals, who almost always are Goldwater conservatives, more and more rarely reach the President. ~~And~~ And those reports which Raborn does relay to the President he gets wrong. (C)

The President finds Raborn boring. (C)

Raborn is insensitive to the professional pride of his staffers. (D)

Conflicting tales leak out of CIA: some pros claim Raborn is purposeful and promising while others say he is inept. (D)

Raborn's lack of qualifications for the job has put CIA at a corporate disadvantage in the jealously-ridden intelligence community, especially in relations with DIA; Raborn is simply outclassed in top policy councils by Defense Secretary McNamara. (D)

LBJ moved Helms up as the professional deputy director and brought Raborn in, as a sort of caretaker for a year or two, since he was a past master at dealing with Congress. (D)

Raborn moved in like a bluff old sailor and began rocking the boat of the thoroughly professional outfit grown somewhat set in its bureaucratic ways. (D)

Raborn ~~Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001R000100160036-1~~ does not know where others are located, and does not know the meaning of words like oligarchy. (D, C, B, J, K)

CPYRGHT

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The Federal Diary

Johnson Displays
Personal Interest
In Economy Drive

By Jerry Kluttz

The President is known in Federal agencies as a "follow-upper" and an incident which happened the other day provides an example of how he has gained that reputation.

Nearly everyone is aware by this time that Mr. Johnson has been pushing for economy and efficiency in



Kluttz

Government with his "war on waste" program and the like. He also has ordered each agency to launch a cost-reduction program. Yet there are always the few skeptics who insist the President is using the economy issue to get political mileage out of it and that he really isn't interested in the merits of the issue.

Well, the other evening just before he left his office, A. E. Weatherbee, Administrative Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, decided to send to the White House a copy of a report he had compiled which showed Treasury had saved \$66 million through various economies during the past four years and half of it was accomplished during the past year since Mr. Johnson has been pounding away at the issue.

Weatherbee and his staff had spent much of the day working on a new cost-reduction program and when he sent the report to the White House he could have wondered if anyone there would even bother with it.

The very next afternoon Weatherbee heard a commotion outside his office and he started out the door to investigate. There stood the President who extended his hand and said he had to come over to personally congratulate the man who was responsible for saving the taxpayers \$66 million.

Weatherbee explained that the agencies had made the economies; that he was merely the "needle like you are" that encouraged them to do it.

The President replied that nothing is more important than efficiency and economy. Vietnam and other such programs notwithstanding.

As the story of the President's midafternoon visit spread through Federal agencies, his cost-cutting program was taken more seriously than ever and officials in other agencies are planning to send reports of their economies to the White House in the hope they too will hear from the President.

Federal officials whom the President has appointed confide that the President has followed up with them to offer his help to solve agency problems. But they say he also uses his "needle" to seek full support for his Great Society and other programs.

As many of the officials are former career civil servants they are pleased by the recognition they have been given by the President of their professional Federal careers and his concern for their successful executive careers.

Mr. Johnson had his appointees and their spouses to

the White House for dinner the other evening. He gave a toast in which he made it clear that he would continue to lean heavily on professional career people of proven ability. Said he in part:

"I strongly believe that the staffing of the Executive positions of our Government has entered a new era within these past four years. At the height of our success—in a Nation bursting with more talent and genius than perhaps any nation has known—we have laid aside the old concept that public positions could and

would be filled with mediocrity, selected on the basis of political preference.

"We have gone forth to find the best in America to make sure that the functioning of our system is the best in the world. To me all of you represent the very best America has produced."

The President revealed that "there is not a man or a woman in this room who asked me for the job they have now. The job has sought the individual and not vice versa. So long as I am here, this will continue. I believe this is the way our system was intended to operate."

His diners must have glowed when he told them that "public service requires much dedication, devotion and self-sacrifice. For those who occupy public positions, there are compensations—rich and meaningful compensations. But the true heroes—and heroines—of public life are those who give more than a full measure of self-sacrifice and receive less than a full measure of recognition. There is one such hero—or heroine—in each family represented here."

3
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Raborn's decline has raised fears about CIA's future. By gradually losing its high place in the Washington bureaucratic structure there is a question whether it will recover anytime soon after Raborn leaves. (I

So long as strong personalities like Dulles and McCone ran CIA its reports had priority over sometimes less reliable reports from DIA and a right-wing element in the latter was kept under tight control by their influence in the President's highest councils. (I

The President has not even called Raborn in to see him since his gall bladder operation two months before the beginning of December, and thus what ought to have been the relentless impact of CIA thinking on the President voiced by the DCI has been absent. (I

Raborn lacks the vital, enthusiastic interest in intelligence reports from the field, displays little curiosity about the intelligence craft, and can scarcely convey it to the President. (I

A lack of sensitivity in Raborn's dealings outside CIA was typified by the shock some Congressmen felt by his explanation of the Dominican crisis. (I

Raborn, being briefed by high Government officials on how to deal with the interlocking community of U.S. intelligence agencies, showed little interest in the basic problem and instead gave a lengthy irrelevant recital of his Polaris experiences. (I

The decline in Agency morale in Washington hasn't hampered operations in the field yet, but some intelligence experts are deeply worried. (I

If CIA's place in Washington continues to give way to DIA, the absolutely essential interchange of intelligence with friendly foreign powers (sometimes as many as 30,000 documents a month with Britain's MI-6) conceivably could be compromised. (I

LBJ selected Raborn partly as a caretaker to calm the Agency's often stormy relations with Congress, to leave after a relatively short period; with popular Raborn as DCI it was thought demands for a congressional watchdog committee would lessen, thus it is ironic that there are increasing demands for this spawned partly by the Raborn-induced CIA crisis. (I

The newest CIA crisis is internal, not external like the Bay of Pigs, and thus may be harder to cure. (I

Raborn's appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigating the Dominican crisis, according to leaks, was inept. (J

A CIA man hearing of the Joseph Kraft column (K) regretted it "because this means he'll stay on for at least another year." (J

In the intelligence community there are daily questions such as: "Things have reached the point where I'm even beginning to wonder whether the Polaris can possibly be a good missile." (I

Such jibes have nothing to do with the missile, rather they are inspired by the performance of Admiral Raborn. Such gossip is sufficiently high level and widespread to merit reporting, the more so as even the Admiral's defenders do not bother to deny the charges. (K

Raborn's defenders argue that attacks are beside the point, that in fact complaints reflect a desirable condition that works to keep the influence of CIA within safe bounds. (K

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The debate debate

CPYRGHT

There is a debate over the debate.

American policy is the topic. The question is whether discussion of it is being inhibited.

Columnist Doris Fleeson has gone so far as to say that a "new McCarthyism" has appeared in "ugly accusations of appeasement being hurled with gathering intensity by self-styled hard-liners against those who urge alternative policies."

From high places there have been charges of ignorance, gullibility, or faint-heartedness against some who disagree with the American policy in Vietnam.

Yet not all the professors at all the teach-ins can be accused of ignorance or worse. "Appeasement" cannot rightly be charged to all those who see a tragic irony in a President offering unconditional discussion at the same time he orders the bombing to continue. When United States troops in the Dominican Republic are added to the stepping up of war in Vietnam, a challenge to the role of international policeman can stem from motives as patriotic as those of citizens who go along with everything Mr. Johnson does.

To the President's credit, he has gone on record in favor of honest discussion of the issues. We agree. The fact that Communists, pro-Communists, or right-wing extremists also may oppose administration policies should not be used to smear those who loyally protest. The threat to American freedom is less from letting all have their say than from suppressing the loyal citizen along with the subversive.

To those in the rest of the world who are alarmed about administration decisions, free debate reinforces the basic American aim of protecting freedom. And

it shows that not all Americans favor military steps of the present kind.

Thus it is encouraging to hear that an internationally circulated lampooner of administration policy is hopeful about the conditions for debate. He is Jules Feiffer, whose satire is not tethered to any narrow political position.

On educational television the other night he said that the national debate on Vietnam suggests that the possibilities for such debate are better now in the United States than at any other time since the cold war began.

Though press and public may receive less information from the government than they would like, they have certainly spoken their minds. Despite the mushy air of consensus, criticism on domestic programs increases. And the debate on foreign policy so far has not been diminished by the "attempts to swamp debate" seen by Miss Fleeson.

Freedom must still be secure in a country where, at the height of military occupation of the Dominican Republic, a television program pictures a sad aftermath of American intervention in another Latin-American country, Guatemala. And when the proadministration Joseph Alsop attacks the critic Hans Morgenthau, the latter is given space to reply. We suggest that neither is an ignorant man.

This newspaper has taken the view that threats to freedom in both Vietnam and the Dominican Republic have warranted military action with a view to the quickest possible recognition of law and the will of the people. Yet we know that even the best policies need the challenge and often the tempering that would be missing without free and open debate.

Raborn's recommendations in the government's highest policy councils are said to bear little relationship to the facts he presents; he occasionally broached as fresh matters subjects that had been exhaustively discussed only five minutes before or his point of departure is the exact opposite of a decision just taken. (K)

Morale has apparently sunk in the research and analysis sections of the Agency particularly among the group preparing long-run estimates. (K)

The defense against these charges depends on discounting their importance: with such sophisticated policy makers as McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy around LBJ is hardly dependent upon the special insights and perception of the DCI. (K)

The great mass of CIA activities are rooted in technology; like all other large government agencies CIA is said to have experienced difficulty in digesting the new technological developments and in using them to best advantage to meet the changing demands for information. ~~XX~~ The present need is to bring CIA abreast of technological responsibilities, and Raborn is said to be doing a good job in this top priority job. (K)

The important thing for the nation's welfare is to keep CIA--with its special vested interest in prolonging the cold war--from ~~mak~~ playing too large a role in the policy-making process. By having a Director more versed in hardware than in policy the flow of information is maintained without the Agency becoming a dominant influence in the basic policy decisions. (K)

The reasons cited above bear all the earmarks of a rationalization after the event. The successor for McCone was supposed to be a good manager with the confidence of the Congress: this is a formula more apt to turn up Babbits than men of nice judgement and a feeling for penetrating analysis. (K)

Raborn has shuttered the CIA public relations office because he decided a super-secret agency does not have any public affairs. (L)

Presidential advisers are looking for scapegoats to blame the Dominican mess on: Raborn is being accused of making too emotional an appeal to the White House about the communist threat; Administration sources should know better since the appeal for prompt action came from McCone. (M)

The digs at Raborn are basically aimed at the intelligence operation he heads; State and Defense have consistently cast aspersions on the value of CIA evaluations. (M)

What leaks out of State, Defense, or CIA privately on the Dominican mess has no relation to the statements issued publicly by the Administration even at the White House level. (M)

Raborn's ~~gung~~ gung-ho approach to his task startled other participants in the high-level conference leading to the decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic. ~~(M)~~ As one of the President's principal advisers remarked afterward he cast himself in the role of Paul Revere charging ~~into~~ into the NSC. (N)

"I wish John McCone was still over there running CIA and I never thought I'd see that day," another participant at the meeting said. (N)

In today's complex and perilous world the direction of a vast intelligence apparatus and the advice based on that operation must be measured against a broad understanding of trends and policies everywhere; a crusading anticommunism, however, dedicated, is hardly a substitute. (N)

Under the new management of Raborn, with his outstanding administrative ability, it may be expected that the \$1 billion fund will function a lot better than it has in the past.. (O)

MAY 9 1965

CPYRGHT

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Censorship Cuts French Ambassador Off Radio

By Waverley Root

The Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, May 8 — An estimated 4 million listeners to radio station Europe Number One this morning heard France's Ambassador to Santo Domingo cut off in the middle of a telephone conversation, apparently by American censorship.

Europe Number One had phoned the French embassy to ask for information on the Gen. Antonio Imber Barrera "government" just formed.

The radio audience heard the Ambassador say: "A new team has just taken over the military junta," and he started to give details on it. An Amer-

ican voice broke in: "I am terminating this communication," and the Ambassador was cut off.

This incident has perhaps helped to strengthen the impression here that the Imbert government is simply the Gen. Elias Wessin military junta in a new costume, hastily

produced for fear some of the Latin American nations—if not France—might recognize Caamano.

[In Washington, James M. Greenfield, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, said "there is no censorship" in Santo Domingo when asked about the Paris report.]

"The Johnson Government, completely discredited in Latin America despite its pyrrhic victory before the OAS Council," writes Le Monde, "is seeking a political solution which will permit it to save the counter-revolutionary forces of Gen. Wessin."

Continuing severe about the whole Santo Domingo operation, Le Monde adds that "in two weeks the United States has wrecked a credit achieved with difficulty since the Alliance for Progress was started in 1962."

ATTACHMENT A

12 Jan 66

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